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A single employee confronted by an employer investigat-
ing whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be
too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the inci-
dent being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenu-
ating factors. A knowledgeable union representative
could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts,
and save the employer production time by getting to the
bottom of the incident occasioning the interview.'
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.2 and International La-
dies Garment Workers Union, Upper South Department v.
Quality Manufacturing Co.3 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or
Board) determination that section 74 of the National Labor
Relations Act' (NLRA or Act) gives an employee the right to
have a union representative present at an investigatory inter-
view which the employee reasonably believes might result in
disciplinary action. The Court found that "the Board's hold-
ing was a permissible construction of 'concerted activities for
.. .mutual aid or protection"" under section 7 because the
employee had engaged in concerted activity by seeking the as-
sistance of another member of the bargaining unit to aid in
© 1982 by Steven J. Barth.
1. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1975).
2. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
3. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
4. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
6. 420 U.S. at 260 (elision in original).
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the protection of her employment interest. Accordingly, an
employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(1)7 of the Act when it denies an employee's request
for union representation at such an interview.
Subsequent decisions by the NLRB have expanded the
scope of Weingarten protections. For example, the Board held
that an employee has a right to consult with his representa-
tive prior to a disciplinary interview,' that he is entitled to
representation at meetings where the employer merely im-
poses discipline,9 and that the proper remedy for violations of
his rights is reinstatement with back pay (a make-whole rem-
edy). 10 One commentator claims that some decisions have
even "extended the Weingarten doctrine to situations argua-
bly not within the contemplation of the Supreme Court.""
Former Board Member Peter Walther criticized those deci-
sions as establishing "a trend which goes beyond the teachings
of the Supreme Court, ignores the realities [of] private indus-
try, and . ..undermines the concept of industrial harmony
which is at the heart of the National Labor Relations Act."' 2
Various United States courts of appeals have disagreed
with the Board's interpretation of Weingarten and have de-
nied enforcement of Board orders." It is the Board's policy to
adhere to established Board precedent which the Supreme
Court has not reversed, regardless of contrary decisions by the
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in § 157 [§ 7] of this title."
8. Climax Molybdenum Co., a Div. of Amax, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977),
enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1977).
9. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement de-
nied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978). But see note 17 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1223 n.1 (1977).
See generally Address by John S. Irving, The Limits of Judicial Deference to NLRB
Expertise, Am. Bar Ass'n's Section of Labor and Employment Law, Marco Island,
Fla. (Mar. 8, 1980), printed in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK [1980] 205, 208-09.
11. D. LESLIE, LABOR LAW 92 (1979).
12. Address by Peter Walther, Climax Molybdenum and Its Progeny-Whither
Weingarten?, 13th Annual Labor-Management Conference on Collective Bargaining
and Labor Law, Tucson, Ariz. (Feb. 18, 1977), partial text printed in LABOR RELA-
TIONS YEARBOOK [1977] 189, 190.
13. Under NLRA §10(e) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976)) the Board has
the power to petition the court of appeals for the circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice occurred or wherein the employer resides or transacts business for the en-
forcement of its order.
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circuits."' Consequently, the Board has instituted proceedings
charging an employer with a violation of an employee's Wein-
garten rights, tried the case, found the employer in violation
of the NLRA and ordered appropriate relief, only to have a
court of appeals refuse to enforce the Board's order. 15 This
conflict between the Board and the courts will probably con-
tinue until the Supreme Court further defines the nature and
extent of an employee's rights.
There is evidence that the Board is willing to modify its
position. With regard to two of the more controversial issues,
the appropriate remedy for violations1 and the nature of the
interview which will give rise to Weingarten rights,17 the
Board has reevaluated its position and adopted a less expan-
sive interpretation of Weingarten. On other disputed issues,
such as the right to pre-interview consultation, the Board has
reaffirmed its position, thereby perpetuating its disagreement
with the courts.
This Comment explores what the Board has called the
"complex scheme of Weingarten1 8 with particular emphasis
on the issues which are unresolved by the Board and the
courts. The Comment examines the development of the repre-
sentation doctrine and discusses the scope of the Supreme
Court's opinions in Weingarten and Quality Manufacturing.
Finally, although it has not been articulated by either the
Board or the courts, the Comment concludes that a right to
effective representation at disciplinary interviews exists. In
reaching this conclusion the Comment identifies and analyzes
six elements of the right to effective representation: (1) the
right to pre-interview consultation, (2) the requirement that
an employee request representation, (3) waiver of the right,
(4) selection of the representative, (5) the proper role of the
14. Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 N.L.R.B. 960, 966 n.4 (1979) (citing Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc., .144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1965)).
15. See, e.g., notes 8 & 9 supra.
16. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980). See notes 159-62 and accompa-
nying text infra.
17. Baton Rouge Water Works, 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979); Price Pfister, 256
N.L.R.B. No. 21 (May 20, 1981).
18. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144 (1981). As one commentator
stated: "It is unfortunately not easy to introduce the unfamiliar reader to the com-
plexities of Weingarten, for it is but the last act in a drama which has been running
for years, with the Board, the courts of appeals, and many unions and employers in
the cast." Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Employment Relation, 56
WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1980).
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representative, and (6) the remedy for a violation of the right.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Early Decisions
The early treatment of the issue of whether the NLRA
provided employees with a right to representation during an
investigation was inconsistent and equivocal. The issue was
first addressed in 1945 in Ross Gear & Tool Co.19 There the
Board held that the employer committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by denying an employee's request for a union representa-
tive. The Board's reasoning, however, was unsatisfactory be-
cause it relied primarily on the fact that the employee was
being disciplined for her union activities (she was called to the
meeting partly in her capacity as a member of the union bar-
gaining committee) rather than relying on a section 7 right to
representation."0 The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of
the decision on the grounds that insubordination would be en-
couraged if employees could refuse to attend meetings unless
their union representative was present.21
The Board did not address the issue again for almost
twenty years. The General Counsel for the NLRB even re-
fused to issue complaints on the matter between 1955 and
1962.22 In 1964 the Board rejected the doctrine of a right to
union representation at disciplinary meetings,s only to re-
verse itself three years later in Texaco, Inc., Houston Produc-
ing Division.2 4 In Texaco the Board based its decision on a
violation of section 8(a)(5) which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the pro-
19. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945).
20. Id. at 1033-34.
21. NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 1947).
22. ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS OF THE NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL, [19551 37
L.R.R.M. 1076 (Case No. K-71). ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF THE NLRB GENERAL
COUNSEL, [1962] CCH Lab. Cas. 111,991 (Case No. SR 2382).
23. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1571 (1964). The Board affirmed
without comment a Trial Examiner's (now Administrative Law Judge) decision dis-
missing the complaint. The Trial Examiner distinguished Ross Gear on the grounds
that the subject of the investigation in Ross Gear was protected union activity. Id.
See also Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 329,
329 n.2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Union Presence].
24. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
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visions of section 9(a)."' The Board drew a distinction be-
tween "investigatory" interviews (meetings where the em-
ployer is merely gathering facts) and "discliplinary" hearings
(meetings where the employer imposes discipline). The right
to representation did not apply in the former situation, but
did in the latter.2' The Board reasoned that a disciplinary ac-
tion involves a change in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment and therefore the employer must consult with the em-
ployee's collective bargaining representative. 7 Subsequent
Board decisions attempting to distinguish between investiga-
tory and disciplinary interviews failed to provide an adequate
standard; the result was uncertainty and confusion. 2S
B. Section 7 as the Basis for the Right to Representation
In three cases29 decided in 1972 and 1973 the Board aban-
doned the Texaco analysis and adopted section 7 as the statu-
tory foundation for the right to union presence at disciplinary
meetings. In rejecting the breach of the duty to bargain under
section 9(a) as the basis for the right, the Board relied on sec-
tion 7's guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 9(a) provides in relevant part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employ-
ees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
26. In Baton Rouge Water Works, 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979), the Board took the
opposite view, holding that investigatory interviews are subject to Weingarten rights,
but meetings where an employer merely announces a predetermined decision to im-
pose discipline are not.
27. This rationale has been criticized by the Supreme Court and by commenta-
tors. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 271 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting);
Union Presence, supra note 23, at 330-32.
28. See, e.g., Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B.
976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839 (1969), enforcement granted on other
grounds, 426 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographical Ser., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B.
357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168
N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
For a discussion of the inadequacy of the standard, see Union Presence, supra
note 23, at 330-32.
29. Weingarten, 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973); Mobil Oil, 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972);
Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972).
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for mutual aid and protection." In each of the three cases the
Board found that the employer committed an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) by interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their sec-
tion 7 rights by denying them union representation at discipli-
nary interviews. The rationale for the Board's conclusion was
that the employee had engaged in concerted activity by seek-
ing the assistance of another member of the bargaining unit to
aid in the protection of the employee's employment interest.3 '
The Board's decisions were not warmly received by the
courts of appeals. Three different courts of appeals reviewed
the Board's orders; all three denied enforcement.3 The
Fourth Circuit based its opinion on the fact that the Board
had established a new right without clearly presenting the
statutory grounds for that right. 83 The Fifth Circuit held that
the Board had misinterpreted the NLRA by adopting an over-
broad interpretation of section 7.34 Both the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits held that the meetings involved therein were investi-
gatory, not disciplinary, and were therefore not subject to pro-
tection under the Board's previous standard. 8
The Seventh Circuit was more direct in its criticism, stat-
ing that the right to representation was not a concerted activ-
ity under a "fair interpretation" of either the broad purpose
or the language of section 7.36 The court declared that the ba-
sic purpose of section 7 was to protect union activity for the
purpose of applying "economic pressure against their employ-
ers in appropriate situations.' 7 It found that concerted eco-
nomic pressure was inappropriate as an element of an investi-
gatory process, because such concerted activity went beyond
the scope of mere employee self-organization.' s Similarly, the
30. See note 4 supra.
31. Mobil Oil, 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052.
32. NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), denying enforce-
ment in pertinent part; NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
33. NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d at 1025.
34. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d at 1138. The court also found that
the Board's construction of § 7 was contrary to its prior construction and was an
impermissible change.
35. NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d at 1025; NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
485 F.2d at 1135.
36. Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRkB, 482 F.2d at 847.
37. Id. at 846-47.
38. "In our opinion, economic pressure may properly be applied to compel em-
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court found nothing in the text of section 7 indicating that a
right to representation should exist. The NLRB petitioned
the United States Supreme Court following this unanimous
rejection by the courts of appeals.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S Weingarten AND Quality
Manufacturing Co. OPINIONS
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.89 and International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union v. Quality Manufacturing Co.4 0 and re-
versed the circuit courts' decisions.4 ' The factual situations in
those cases are illustrative of cases concerning employee re-
quests for representation at disciplinary interviews. From that
standpoint it is useful to examine those facts in order to bet-
ter comprehend and evaluate the significance of the rights
conferred by the Supreme Court.
A. The Facts
Leura Collins wai employed at J. Weingarten, Inc., a
Texas retail store chain. She had previously worked at the
lunch counter in Store No. 2 of the chain for nine years before
transferring in 1970 to the "lobby food operation" at Store
No. 98. In June of 1972 the company sent a "loss prevention
specialist" to investigate surreptitiously a complaint that Col-
lins was taking money from her cash register. After two days
of covert surveillance the specialist disclosed his presence to
the store manager and reported that he had observed no dis-
honest activity. The manager then told the specialist that he
had received a complaint from another employee that Collins
had purchased a box of chicken that sold for $2.98 and had
placed only $1.00 in the cash register. The manager and the
security specialist then interrogated Collins regarding the in-
cident. Several times during the interview Collins asked that
some union representative be present, but her requests were
refused. Collins admitted that she had purchased some chick-
ployers to follow acceptable investigatory procedures, or to determine the conse-
quences of various kinds of misconduct, but economic pressure should not be a com-
ponent of the fact-finding process itself." Id. at 847.
39. 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
40. 416 U.S. 968 (1974).
41. 420 U.S. 251 (1975); 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
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en and other food which she donated to her church for a
church dinner. She explained that she had taken only $1.00
worth of chicken but had to put the chicken in the larger
$2.98-size box because the store was out of the smaller dollar-
size boxes. An immediate investigation by the security special-
ist confirmed her statement. When the specialist apologized
for inconveniencing her, Collins burst into tears and claimed
that the only thing she had ever received from the store with-
out paying for it was her "free lunch."
This remark caused the manager and the specialist to
continue the interview, because they believed that although
there was a free lunch policy at stores with lunch counters,
there was no such policy at Store No. 98 because it was a
"lobby operation." Collins again requested union representa-
tion. Again her request was denied and the interview contin-
ued. No disciplinary action was taken, however, when it was
discovered that most employees at Store No. 98, including the
department manager, took free lunches.
Contrary to the store manager's request Collins reported
the incident to her union shop steward. The union filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB, which led to the
Board's finding of a violation of section 8(a)(1) and the subse-
quent decision by the Fifth Circuit denying enforcement of
the Board's order.
The companion case, Quality Manufacturing Co., in-
volved a similar denial of union representation by the em-
ployer. There, however, the employer discharged the employee
requesting representation, her shop chairwoman, and the shop
steward. Catherine King, the employee being interviewed, was
discharged for refusing to attend the interview unaccompa-
nied by a representative; Delia Mulford, the shop chairwo-
man, was discharged for her persistence in seeking to re-
present King at the interview; Martha Cochran, the shop
steward, was discharged for filing grievances on behalf of the
other two."2 The employer was therefore charged with and
found in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)."' The
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order.
42. 420 U.S. at 277-78.
43. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discrim-
inate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment, or to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
44. 481 F.2d 1018.
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B. The Rationale for the Court's Opinions
The Court gave three reasons for reversing the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits and holding that employees have a right to
union representation at disciplinary interviews. First, the
right was warranted by a proper interpretation of the
NLRA.45 Contrary to the courts of appeals, the Supreme
Court declared that the Board's holding that "employees shall
have the right . . . to engage in . ..concerted activities for
mutual aid or protection""' was a permissible construction of
the wording of section 7. The Court found that the action of
seeking assistance at an employer confrontation falls within
the literal wording of that section despite the fact that only an
individual employee would have an immediate stake in the
outcome of the meeting. 7 In the Court's opinion, the presence
of the union representative would serve to assure other mem-
bers of the bargaining unit that they could also have union
representation if they were called into a similar interview."
Second, the right to representation effectuates the pur-
poses of the NLRA. The Court found that a primary goal
of the Act is to protect self-organization for mutual aid or
protection; to achieve that goal the NLRA "is designed to
eliminate the 'inequality of bargaining power between em-
ployees. . . and employers.' ",49 Such inequality would be per-
petuated if employees were required to attend investigatory
interviews alone. °
Third, there are practical reasons for upholding such a re-
quirement. The union representative could help clarify the is-
sues, elicit facts and assist employees who, because of the cir-
cumstances, may be too fearful or inarticulate to represent
themselves accurately.5"
45. 420 U.S. at 260-61.
46. Id. at 260 (elision in original).
47. Id.
48. The Court also noted that the union representative would be protecting the
interests of the entire bargaining unit by making certain that the employer did not
impose punishment unjustly. Id. at 260-61 (citing Union Presence, supra note 23).
49. 420 U.S. at 262 (quoting § 1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935)) (elision in
original).
50. 420 U.S. at 262.
51. Id. at 262-63 (citing Independent Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 744, 746 (1958),
and Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 647, 651 (1965)). See also Union Presence,
supra note 23, at 344 which states:
Notwithstanding the apprehensions of employers, union representa-
1982]
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C. Limits on the Right to Union Representation
The Board and the Supreme Court realized that an em-
ployer may have legitimate concerns regarding union repre-
sentation at investigatory interviews. Primarily, employers
fear that requiring representation would disrupt work and ob-
struct the fact-finding process of the interviews." Accordingly,
the Court emphasized four standards that the Board had for-
mulated in its Mobil Oil Corp." and Quality Manufacturing
Co. opinions limiting the right to representation."4
First, the employee must request representation. If the
employee prefers, he may attend the interview unaccompa-
nied by a representative."
Second, the right to representation attaches only when
the employee reasonably believes discipline may result from
the interview.' 6 The Court quoted from the Board's decision
in Quality Manufacturing Co. that the reasonableness of the
tion at disciplinary meetings may bring them substantial benefits. Early
union involvement will allow the steward to discourage the prosecution
of frivolous grievances. Early union review of employer decisions will
also give the employer an opportunity to correct errors that might pro-
duce ill feeling among employees. At the time of the meeting neither
party is locked into any position, but as a grievance proceeds, the ability
to compromise diminishes. The inadequacy of grievance procedures for
fact finding affects both employers and unions. Union representation
could guarantee a better understanding of the infraction charged, and
early, informal consideration of the merits of possible grievances might
reduce the costs that the employer must bear in formalized grievance
procedures. (Footnotes omitted.)
52. See Decker, Public Sector Union Representation Rights at Investigatory
Interviews in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REv. 655 (1979).
Employers insist that union presence at investigatory interviews re-
sults in disruption of operations and challenges their authority. Indeed,
employers have a significant interest in preserving their power to inves-
tigate working conditions or job performance absent union interference.
An employer would not desire a union representative who perceived his
role as counsel in a criminal case. Employers fear situations in which the
union representative instructs the employee how to respond. These fears
may be compounded by the employer's interest in avoiding unnecessary
conferences resulting in disciplinary delays.
Id. at 659. See also Union Presence, supra note 23, at 344.
53. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
54. 420 U.S. at 256-60.
55. Id. at 257.
56. The Court uses both "may," 420 U.S. at 257, and "will," id. at 258, in speak-
ing of the reasonable belief of discipline being imposed. The logic of the Court's opin-
ion and subsequent decisions by the NLRB indicate that "may" is the proper
construction.
UNION REPRESENTATION
employee's belief is to be measured objectively in light of all
the circumstances of the case.5 7 The purpose of this limita-
tion, as stated by the Board, was to exclude ordinary shop-
floor conversations concerning such matters as training or cor-
rection of work techniques.5 8
Third, the exercise of the right may not interfere with le-
gitimate employer prerogatives. Although the employee may
desire a representative, the employer may refuse to allow rep-
resentation and is not obligated to justify the refusal. The em-
ployer may merely announce that the interview will not pro-
ceed unless the employee is willing to attend without a
representative. The employee may then refrain from partici-
pating, but in doing so he relinquishes any benefit that could
be derived from the interview. For example, by deciding not
to participate the employee may lose his opportunity to state
his version of the events. The employer is then free to act on
information obtained from other sources. 9
Fourth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any
union representative who may attend the interview. Although
the representative is there to assist the employee and may
attempt to clarify the issues, the employer may insist on hear-
ing only the employee's account of the matter under
investigation."
There is an inherent incompatibility between the reasons
for the Court's opinion and the four limitations imposed by
the Court. That incompatibility has resulted in disagreements
about the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's
57. 420 U.S. at 257-58 n.5. The Court also cites NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969) for the proposition that it rejects any probe of an employee's
subjective motivations. But see Decker, supra note 52, at 667-69 (the test is actually
subjective since it relies on the employee's beliefs).
58. 420 U.S. 257-58 (quoting Quality Mfg. Co. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199).
59. 420 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting the Board's opinions in Mobil Oil and Quality
Mfg). In subsequent decisions the Board enumerated the employer's options. Once a
valid request for representation has been made, the burden is on the employer to: (1)
grant the request; (2) discontinue the interview (Amoco Oil Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 551
(1978)); or (3) offer the employee the choice of either continuing the interview unac-
companied by a union representative or having no interview at all (Mehary Medical
College, 236 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1978)). The employer may not continue an interview
without granting the employee representation unless the employee voluntarily agrees
to remain unrepresented after having been informed of the choices stated in option
(3), "or if the employee is otherwise aware of those choices." United States Postal
Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979) (citing Super Valu Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1581
(1978)).
60. 420 U.S. at 259-60 (quoting Brief for the NLRB).
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opinion.
D. Criticisms of the Court's Opinion
Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's
opinion creates a paradox." The Court points out the need to
provide the lone, fearful and inarticulate or ignorant employ-
ees with a representative.62 At the same time the Court con-
siders the employee sufficiently aware of the attendant cir-
cumstances that he will have the presence of mind to make an
intelligent decision whether to waive representation." This is
particularly contradictory since in order to be entitled to rep-
resentation at all the employee must "reasonably" believe
that the investigatory interview will result in disciplinary ac-
tion. 4 Also, if the Court's opinion is construed to place the
burden for the invocation of Weingarten rights entirely on the
employee, the union's role in that regard is very limited.
The Court's comments on the nature of the representa-
tive's role are also inconsistent. In dicta the Court states that
a "knowledgeable union representative" could help elicit
favorable facts, clarify the issues, assist employees who lack
the ability to express themselves, and take steps to discourage
formal grievances where the employer's actions appear justi-
fied. 5 Conversely, the employer " 'is free to insist that he is
only interested, at that time, in hearing the employee's own
account of the matter under investigation.' "66 Given these
conflicting statements from the Court it is not surprising that
61. See, e.g., Brousseau, supra note 18, at 4-5 where the author states:
The Court suggests that the right to representation depends on the
reasonableness of the employee's fear of punishment. Paradoxically, the
Court in the same opinion gives us language which is formalistically rec-
oncilable but in fact completely inconsistent with this notion of reasona-
ble fear. . . .Evidently there is a fastidiously precise threshhold [sic] of
fear, which, becoming "reasonable," renders one "too fearful or inarticu-
late to relate accurately the incident being investigated," thus triggering
a section 7 right in the employee. And yet we are told that this ignorant,
fearful and inarticulate employee may intelligently waive this right. This
is not merely paradoxical, it is absurd. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis in
original).
See also Note, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 6 SroN HALL L. REV. 514, 532-33
(1975).
62. 420 U.S. at 262-63.
63. Id. at 257-58.
64. Id. at 257.
65. Id. at 262-63 n.7.
66. Id. at 260 (quoting Brief for NLRB at 22).
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the NLRB and the circuits have been unable to agree on the
nature and extent of the right to representation.
IV. RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
The limitations that the Supreme Court placed on the
employee's protected right to union representation make it
clear that the right is not absolute. The NLRB has generally
construed those limitations more narrowly than have the
courts of appeals. Consequently, the representative has been
given a more active role under the Board's decisions.
Although neither the Board nor the courts have ever spe-
cifically stated that an employee has a right to effective repre-
sentation, recent Board decisions suggest that such a right ex-
ists. The Board alluded to a right to effective representation
in connection with preinterview consultation 67 and subsequent
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions have expanded
that concept in cases concerning the proper role of the repre-
sentative.68 There is more to effective representation, however,
than merely recognizing a right to preinterview consultation
and expanding the role of the representative. A right to effec-
tive representation involves several interrelated elements
which cover various aspects of the Weingarten rights.
This section of the Comment identifies and analyzes six
elements of an integrated right to effective representation. It
suggests resolutions to issues that are unresolved by the
Board and the courts.
A. The Right to Preinterview Consultation
Preinterview consultation is one of the more controversial
aspects of Weingarten.9 A discussion of the necessity of a re-
quest and waiver will indicate that it is the cornerstone of ef-
fective representation.7 0 The employee is more likely to fully
exercise his section 7 rights if the union representative has an
adequate opportunity to inform him of those rights. As dis-
cussed below, preinterview consultation also has additional
67. Climax Molybdenum, 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977). See notes 71-91 and accom-
panying text infra.
68. See AUJ decisions in Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 1007 (1979);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Address by Walther supra note 12.
70. See notes 92-125 and accompanying text infra.
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advantages.
In Climax Molybdenum Company, a Division of Amax,
Inc."1 (Climax) the Board announced that Weingarten pro-
vides an opportunity for preinterview consultation. In that
case the Board held that an employer violated section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA by refusing to permit a union representative to
consult with two employees on company time prior to an in-
vestigatory meeting which could have resulted in disciplinary
action. The two employees had been involved in an altercation
and their supervisor told them that the matter would be set-
tled the next day. The union grievance representative was no-
tified by the company, as required by the collective-bargain-
ing agreement, that an investigatory meeting would be held,
but he was not informed of the names of the employees.
Neither of the employees requested representation. The next
morning, before the meeting started, the representative asked
the employer if he could talk to the two employees alone. This
request by the union official for a preinterview consultation on
company time was denied.
The Board relied on two sentences from Weingarten in
reaching its conclusion:
A single employee confronted by an employer investigat-
ing whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be
too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident
being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating
factors. A knowledgeable union repesentative could assist
the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the
employer production time by getting to the bottom of the
incident occasioning the interview.'
The Board78 took the position that a union representative
must have the opportunity to consult with the employee prior
to the interview in order to discover his version of the inci-
dent. This is necessary, the Board declared, in order for the
representative to "represent effectively" a fearful or inarticu-
late employee and to elicit facts favorable to the employee.'4
71. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977).
72. 420 U.S. at 262-63 (emphasis added).
73. Then-Chairman Murphy and Member Jenkins in a plurality decision.
74. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190 (emphasis added).
In United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979), the ALJ, holding that
Weingarten rights are not waived with Miranda rights, examined the rationale for
Weingarten rights in the context of a preinterview consultation:
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The Board intimated that this would also benefit the em-
ployer since the fearful or inarticulate employee would be
more inclined to reveal his version of the facts to his union
representative outside the employer's presence and the repre-
sentative could then help explain those facts to the
employer.7 5
The Board found that this holding was consistent with
the Supreme Court's opinion in Weingarten. There the Court
said that employees were entitled to "a knowledgeable union
representative" who could aid the employer in eliciting facts."'
The Board concluded that knowledge implies that the repre-
sentative have a chance to learn the facts before the interview.
Additionally, the representative's assistance in eliciting facts
"can be performed better, and perhaps only, if he can consult
with the employee beforehand."'7
While concurring, Member Fanning nevertheless dis-
agreed with the majority's characterization of the decision as
an "extension" of Weingarten rights.78 According to Fanning,
prior consultation "is not something different than, nor supe-
rior to, the act of representation itself; it is simply an aspect
of that function which enables the representative to fulfill his
role." 79 He also pointed out that prior consultation is a com-
mon component of representation of another person's inter-
ests, which is necessary for intelligent and effective
representation."0
Members Penello and Walther dissented. They argued
that the Supreme Court did not envision prior consultation as
part of the Weingarten rights, and that in using the term
"knowledgeable union representative" the Court meant only a
It is true that Miranda and Weingarten share one very similar ethical
foundation-namely, the belief that a lone individual is subjected to un-
fair pressures when he is compelled, without being given the right to
informed assistance, to submit to an interview about his alleged short-
comings with trained interrogators empowered to cause him to suffer
adverse consequences therefor. Perhaps because of this common ethical
foundation, both Miranda and Weingarten rights include the right to
preinterview consultation with the representative.
Id. at 151.
75. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
76. 420 U.S. at 263.
77. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
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person who is generally knowledgeable about grievance resolu-
tion, not one who is familiar with the employee's particular
version of the events.
The Tenth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in
Climax."' The court focused on two of the five "contours and
limits" of the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten: the
right to union representation arises only where an employee
has requested it and the exercise of the right may not inter-
fere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Based on these
limitations the court held' there was no right to a preinterview
conference on company time. The court went on, however, to
state that Weingarten requires the employer to set interviews
at a future time so that the employee can consult with his
representative prior to the interview on his own time.82
One commentator suggests that, the Board's decision in
Roadway Express, Inc.83 is more significant to the continued
vitality of the right to preinterview consultation than is the
Tenth Circuit's denial of enforcement in Climax. 4 In Road-
way Express the Board stated that an employee's right to rep-
resentation "matures at the commencement of the inter-
view. '" 8 The commentator claims that by that statement the
Board indicated that it has reconsidered its position on the
right to preinterview consultation." Roadway Express in-
volved an employee's refusal to leave the production area and
go to his supervisor's office unless he was accompanied by his
union representative. Contrary to the view expressed by the
commentator, preinterview consultation was not an issue in
Roadway Express; neither the Board nor the ALJ who heard
the case considered it an issue. The employee did not request
a preinterview consultation and the Board merely held that
81. Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360 (1977).
82. The employer is under no obligation to accord the employee subject
to an investigatory interview with consultation with his union represent-
atives on company time if the interview date otherwise provides the em-
ployee adequate opportunity to consult with union representatives on
his own time prior to the interview. Thus we do believe that Weingarten
requires that the employer set investigatory interviews at such a future
time and place that the employee will be provided the opportunity to
consult with his representative in advance thereof on his own time.
Id. at 365.
83. 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979).
84. [1981] 106 L.R.R.M. 9 (Analysis).
85. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1128.
86. [1981] 106 L.R.R.M. 9, 12 (Analysis).
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the employee was not privileged to ignore the employer's re-
quest to leave the production area.8 7
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Climax is a reasonable ap-
proach to preinterview consultation. Although Weingarten
did not specifically grant representatives the opportunity to
consult with employees prior to interviews, it did attempt to
strike a balance between employees' rights and management's
perogatives. That balance is struck by the Tenth Circuit's rea-
sonable requirement that the employer postpone the interview
until the employee can consult with his union representative
on his own time.8 8 Preinterview consultation not only pro-
motes effective representation by allowing the representative
to advise the employee of his Weingarten rights, but also en-
ables the representative to participate in the interview on an
informed basis. A major criticism of Weingarten is that union
representatives may tend to disrupt the interview; " they are
less likely to be disruptive if they do not have to wait until
they walk into the interview to learn the facts. Unlike the sit-
uation in Climax, the representative probably will not instruct
the employee to remain silent because the hearing is primarily
in the employee's interest since the employer could discipline
the employee based on information obtained from other
sources.
A point the Board has not yet considered is whether the
union must be notified of the disciplinary interview before the
interview is held. Nothing in Weingarten suggests that such a
requirement exists. Arguably that requirement would be a log-
ical extention of the Board's Climax decision, but the trend of
recent Board decisions on Weingarten rights intimates that
the Board probably will not pronounce such a requirement.
Clearly, the union can obtain a notification provision through
collective bargaining, as the union did in Climax,'0 but neither
87. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1129.
88. Cf. Annual Survey of Labor Law, 21 B.C. L. REV. 85, 151 (1979) (authors
express support for that part of the court's opinion in Climax that held there is no
right to preinterview consultation during company time, as a proper balance of Wein-
garten rights).
89. See, Decker, supra note 52. See generally B. CRANE & R. HOFFMANN, SUC-
CESSFUL HANDLING OF LABOR GRIEVANCES 14 (1956).
90. See also Volkswagen of America, Inc., (JD-667-80) issued Nov. 17, 1980
(employer found in violation of § 8(a)(1) for denying a request for preinterview con-
sultation notwithstanding employer's established practice of permitting such consul-
tation, which stemmed from provision of collective-bargaining agreement).
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the Board nor the courts have indicated that notification is
required independently of a collective-bargaining agreement.1
B. Necessity of a Request
There is no right to representation unless it has been re-
quested."' The Supreme Court's specific language was "the
right arises only in situations where the employee requests
representation."93 Although this could be interpreted to mean
that it is merely the employee's decision whether he wishes to
be represented, the courts have construed that language liter-
ally to mean that the actual request for representation must
come from the employee."'
Several commentators have criticized the logic of requir-
ing employees faced with the obviously disconcerting prospect
of being disciplined to maintain the presence of mind to ask
for representation. 5 In Climax the Board specifically stated
that Weingarten rights could be invoked by a request from
the union." The Board, in a plurality opinion,97 held that the
union had a right to a preinterview consultation with employ-
ees and, in order to effectuate that right, it also had the right
to request consultation. In his concurring opinion Fanning
declared that it makes no difference whether the request is
91. Arguably, a notification requirement is necessary to fully effectuate the
right to preinterview consultation. If the union is unaware of a disciplinary interview
due to either geographic or temporal restrictions, it is unable to exercise its ability
under Climax to request representation at the interview.
92. The test for determining whether a request is effective is: Was the em-
ployee's request for union representation sufficient, measured by objective standards,
to put the employer on notice of the employee's desire for representation? Southwest-
ern Bell Tel., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
93. The Court went on to explain: "In other words, the employee may forgo his
guaranteed right and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by his
union representative." 420 U.S. at 257.
94. Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d at 363 ("Weingarten holds
that the employee must request representation." (Emphasis in original)). See also
Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931, 932 (1980); Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., (JD-
(SF)-38-81) issued February 13, 1981.
95. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
96. The plurality of then-Chairman Murphy and Member Jenkins held that al-
though the union's request would be effective because the collective-bargaining agree-
ment involved therein provided for union representation at disciplinary interviews,
even if it did not, "the denial of this right upon the Union's request is a denial of
representation." 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
97. Member Fanning concurring.
98. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190.
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from the employee or the union." Fanning based his opinion
on the Supreme Court's Quality Manufacturing'00 decision
which, in his view, held that the union officers who insisted on
being present at the disciplinary hearing "were themselves en-
gaging in a protected concerted activity." 10 1
The Board appears to have retreated from the Climax de-
cision. In its recent Appalachian Power' 2 opinion the Board
affirmed without comment the ALJ's decision that the em-
ployer had not denied two employees their Weingarten rights
during an investigative interview when the employer denied
their union steward's request to attend the interview. The
ALJ also found that the employees' requests were insufficient
because they never communicated the request directly to the
employer. 03 Neither the ALJ nor the Board mentioned Cli-
max in their opinions so the precise effect of Appalachian
Power is uncertain.'04
The argument could be made that under Climax the
union's right to request representation is limited to represen-
tation at a preinterview conference. No such preinterview con-
ference was involved in Appalachian Power. An interpreta-
tion which would resolve the apparent conflict between
Climax and Appalachian Power, and which would also take
cognizance of the Supreme Court's limitations in Weingarten,
is that the union has the right to request a preinterview con-
ference to inform an employee of his right to representation
and the options available to him and the employer under
Weingarten,"0 5 but the employee must specifically request
representation at the actual interview. The union cannot de-
mand to be present at the interview contrary to the em-
ployee's wishes. Since the individual employee must bear the
99. Id. at 1191-92.
100. I.L.G.W.U. v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
101. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1192.
102. 253 N.L.R.B. 931 (1980).
103. Id. at 931-32. In Lennox Indus., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 607 (1979) the Board
found that an employee's request made to one company official was insufficient to
invoke Weingarten protections where the request was not made known to the official
who conducted the interview.
104. But cf. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., (JD (SF)-38-81) issued Feb. 13, 1981, slip
op. at JD 6 n.7 (The ALJ stated that in Appalachian Power the Board reversed the
aspect of Climax concerning the union's right to invoke representation.); Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 257 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1981) (The ALJ relied on Climax in finding that
the union's request for representation was sufficient.).
105. See note 59 supra.
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consequences of the disciplinary process he should determine
whether representation at the interview is in his best interest.
The union should have the opportunity to request
preinterview consultation with the employee to inform him of
his options so that his decision whether to invoke his right to
representation is made on an informed basis. The union
should have that right not only to safeguard the employee's
employment interests, but also as an "assurance to other em-
ployees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain [pro-
tection at a similar interview]." 10 6 This resolution would en-
courage effective representation by assuring that employees
act in their own best interests based on a full understanding
of their rights.
Notification of the union prior to the interview may well
be in the employer's best interest. First, this pro forma notifi-
cation would avoid delaying the disciplinary process since the
employer would not have to interrupt a discussion with the
employee if the employee requests a representative during the
interview. Second, notification of the union would discourage
a discharged employee who did not request a representative
from later filing a charge with the NLRB, claiming he was de-
nied representation and, therefore, should be reinstated and
entitled to back pay. This may occur where the employee did
not realize during the interview that he might be disciplined
or where he did not know of his right to representation until
afterwards. In a subsequent unfair labor practice hearing
where the employee claims he requested representation and
the employer claims he did not, the result will involve a credi-
bility resolution for the ALJ and circumstantial evidence may
point to the probability that the employee made such a re-
quest. Thus, attorneys should advise their employer-clients
that notification of the union prior to any disciplinary hearing
may expedite the disciplinary process and avoid subsequent
litigation.
C. Waiver of the Right to Representation
The corollary of the right to obtain union representation
at disciplinary interviews is the ability to waive that right.
Waiver occurs in three contexts: express waiver by the em-
106. 420 U.S. at 261.
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ployee, implied waiver by the employee, and waiver by the
union through collective bargaining.
1. Express waiver
Since the right to representation arises only where the
employee requests it, the employee "may forgo his guaranteed
right and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccom-
panied by his union representative.' 0 If an employee deter-
mines that it is in his best interest to proceed with the inter-
view without a representative he should be allowed to do so.
2. Implied waiver.
A totally different situation occurs when the employer
claims that the employee waived his rights by implication.
Generally, the criterion for ascertaining whether a statutory
right has been waived is the "clear and unmistakable" stan-
dard.10 8 The Board has declared that waiver of the right to
representation will not be inferred unless the Board is con-
vinced that the right was waived knowingly and voluntarily.' 09
Consequently, the Board has held that the right to represen-
tation is not waived where circumstances indicate coercion," 0
or where the employee waives his Miranda"' rights in an in-
vestigation of possible criminal acts,11 2 or merely by beginning
the interview. " 8
3. Waiver through collective bargaining
The Board has not addressed the issue of whether Wein-
107. Id. at 257.
108. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Pepsi-Cola Distrib. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 869 (1979).
109. Southwestern Bell Tel., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, (quoting Union Presence,
supra note 23, at 350). See also Super Valu Stores, 236 NLRB 1581 (an investigatory
interview is inherently coercive and the employee should be given the benefit of any
doubt regarding waiver), enforcement denied, Super Valu Xenia, a Div. of Super
Valu Stores v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 13 (1980). Accord, "Specifically, the Board's policy is
to find no waiver where an employee has not been expressly advised of her option to
remain silent, absent evidence that the employee was otherwise aware of that right."
Brief for NLRB at 13, NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 80-2629.
110. Southwestern Bell Tel., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223 (employer unlawfully inter-
fered with its employees' rights by threatening them with more severe discipline if
they exercised their right to representation).
111. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
112. United States Postal Serv. (Denver Bulk Mail Center), 254 N.L.R.B. No.
50 (1981); United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979).
113. Texaco, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1980) (the mere fact that the employee
did not request a representative at the beginning of the interview does not constitute
a waiver because he may not perceive the need for representation until the interview
has begun); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 849 (1978); Texarkana Memorial
Hosp., 238 N.L.R.B. 829 (1978).
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garten rights can be waived or restricted by contract."" The
Supreme Court's opinion in Weingarten "provides no indica-
tion whether such waivers in the collective bargaining process
are permissible." ' A union probably can bargain away its
own right to be present at disciplinary interviews.'" The
greater question is whether it also has the power to relinquish
the employee's right under section 7.
It is well established that unions can surrender contractu-
ally the section 7 right to strike,'17 and they may waive their
right to select persons to negotiate grievances with the em-
ployer. '6 Thus, by analogy, Weingarten rights are probably
waivable by the union through the collective bargaining
process.
In Western Electric Co.119 then-Chairman Miller, in a
concurring opinion, asserted that there was no violation of the
right to union representation at an investigatory interview be-
cause the union had effectively waived the employees' right
through collective bargaining." ' He analogized the right to
waive union representation at disciplinary interviews to the
union's ability to waive other section 7 rights. Western Elec-
tric, however, was decided prior to Weingarten and the plu-
rality opinion therein relied on dissents in cases which were
subsequently affirmed in Weingarten.2 1 Thus the Board still
considers it an open issue.
2
Because the right to representation at a disciplinary in-
terview is so important to the individual employee, waiver of
that right through collective bargaining should not be readily
inferred. In reviewing instances of waiver through collective
114. Brief for the NLRB at 14 n.7, Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, No.
80-7714 (brief filed Feb. 6, 1981).
115. 420 U.S. at 275 n.8.
116. See Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 23 (1977); Union Presence, supra note 23, at 349-50. The Board construes
the union's ability to waive employee rights very narrowly. The union may wish to
take the position to waive rights at certain hearings over minor violations provided no
notice or warning is placed in the employee's file.
117. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960).
118. Shell Oil Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 161, 164 (1951).
119. 198 N.L.R.B. 623 (1972).
120. Id. at 625-26.
121. Members Kennedy and Penello relied on Member Kennedy's dissents in
Quality Mfg. and Mobil Oil.
122. See Brief for NLRB at 14, supra note 114.
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bargaining, the Board or the court should determine whether
the waiver was clear and unmistakable.' 3 Then it should de-
termine, after examining the nature of the right, whether
waiver violates the underlying policies of the NLRA.'2 4 The
union's waiver of employees' rights should require a showing
that the bargaining unit's interests take precedence over the
individual's rights.125
Obviously, employees would be represented more effec-
tively if their rights were not waived either by themselves or
the union. If, however, the employee considers it in his best
interest to proceed unrepresented he should have that right
even though the disciplinary decision may have a precedential
effect, either substantively or procedurally, on the remainder
of the bargaining unit. By providing a preinterview consulta-
tion the union can aid the lone employee facing a disciplinary
hearing in making an informed decision whether to waive his
Weingarten rights.
D. Selection of a Representative
Although an employee has a right upon request to repre-
sentation at a disciplinary interview, he does not have the
right to a particular representative. In Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of Los Angeles'2 6 (Coca Cola) the Board held that an em-
ployer need not postpone an interview with an employee be-
cause a particular representative is unavailable, where another
representative is available and whose presence could have
been requested. In Coca-Cola an employee requested the pres-
ence of a representative whom he knew was on vacation. The
interview was to be held on a Friday and the steward he re-
quested would not return from vacation until the following
Monday. The Board found that the employee was merely at-
tempting to delay the interview and concluded that such ac-
tion interfered with the employer's legitimate prerogative to
conduct the investigation without delay. 27
123. See cases cited at note 108 supra.
124. See Note, Employee Right to Union Representation During Interrogation,
7 TOL. L. REV. 298, 316 (1975).
125. See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 328 (1974).
126. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977).
127. Accord, Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979). But cf. Super
Valu Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1591, enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.
1980) (In the absence of any representative at the plant at the time of the interview,
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It was unclear after Coca-Cola whether an employee had
the right to a representative of his choice where providing him
with such a representative would not significantly delay the
interview. The Board addressed that issue in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.' 2 and found that there was no right to a particu-
lar representative even where the delay would be only fifteen
to forty minutes.'
29
The Board's position that an employee does not have a
right to a representative of his choice is a reasonable interpre-
tation of Weingarten because it acknowledges both the rights
of the employee and the employer's prerogatives. If a repre-
sentative selected by the union is readily available to assist an
employee then the employee's rights are protected. Under
Weingarten the rights of the employee must be balanced with
the employer's right to operate his business. Allowing an em-
ployee to select a particular representative could be too dis-
ruptive of an employer's operations. It could also allow the
employee to circumvent a collective-bargaining agreement if
the employer and the union have agreed upon a certain
procedure. 3 0
On the other hand, the employer should not be allowed to
control who will represent the employee.' 8 ' If more than one
an employer must respect the employee's request for assistance even if it means de-
laying the interview.).
Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting in Coca-Cola, claimed that the em-
ployee had done all that was required by Weingarten by asking for his steward. The
burden shifted to the employer, they asserted, to stop the interview or offer the em-
ployee the choice of either participating in the interview without his steward or not
participating in an interview at all. To put the burden of requesting an alternate
representative on the employee would negate the purpose of Weingarten since "it is
because employees are not skilled in the niceties of procedure that they need help."
227 N.L.R.B. at 1277.
In Roadway Express the Board responded to the contention of the Coca-Cola
dissenters. The Board stated that while it is true that the employer must offer the
employee those options, the employer does not have to do so unless and until the
employee makes a valid request for union representation. The employee in Coca-Cola
did not make a valid request when he asked for a representative whom he knew was
unavailable. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1129.
128. 253 N.L.R.B. at 1148 (1981).
129. Member Jenkins, dissenting, claimed the delay would be 15 to 20 minutes;
the majority said the delay could be as long as 40 minutes.
130. See generally Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Community Organi-
zation, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (employees cannot circumvent their elected representative
to bargain separately with the employer).
131. See Member Jenkins' dissent in Pacific Gas & Elec., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143
(1981).
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representative is available or is provided for in the collective-
bargaining agreement then the employee should be able to se-
lect the representative he feels will best represent him. An
employee should also be allowed to select someone else when
the person provided to represent the employee has an interest
in the outcome of the disciplinary process that conflicts with
the employee's interest in being adequately represented."3 2 Ef-
fective representation is promoted by providing the employee
with a representative in whom he has confidence.
E. Proper Role of the Representative
Although in Weingarten the Supreme Court went into
great detail about the benefits a knowledgeable union repre-
sentative could bring to disciplinary interviews,"33 it also indi-
cated that the role of the representative is limited."" The em-
ployer is under no duty to bargain with the representative at
the meeting. The representative is there to assist the em-
ployee in bringing out favorable facts and to present extenuat-
ing circumstances.3 5 He is not there to serve as the em-
ployee's attorney or to transform the interview into an
adversary proceeding. The employer is free to insist on hear-
ing only the employee's statement of the facts.""
Despite the limitation imposed on the representative, his
role is more than the "mute and inactive presence of . . . a
witness to the interview,"' 87 as the dissent in Weingarten
claimed. In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., (C. W.A. Local
132. Such a conflict may occur either when the representative has a personal
interest in the outcome or when there is a conflict between the job classifications of
the employee and the representative (e.g., when the act for which the employee may
be disciplined involves a dispute about the duties of an apprentice employee and a
journeyman representative). The burden should be on the employee to show that
there is a conflict of interest because permitting the employee to select a particular
representative circumvents the collective bargaining agreement and may disrupt the
work place.
133. 420 U.S. at 262-63. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
134. Id. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra.
135. Id. See also Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978) (The union repre-
sentative's role is limited to assisting the employee and possibly attempting to clarify
the facts or suggesting other employees who may have knowledge of them.).
136. 420 U.S. at 260.
137. Id. at 273 n.5.
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12222)138 the Board unanimously'3 9 held that the employer vi-
olated its employee's section 7 rights by requiring the union
steward to remain silent during the interview.' 40 Noting the
Supreme Court's detailed explanation of the role of the repre-
sentative, the Board reasoned that Weingarten entitled the
employee to the assistance of a representative, not the mere
presence of that representative. The Board rejected the em-
ployer's contention that it was free to insist on only hearing
the employee's statement of the facts. The Board found, view-
ing the Supreme Court's opinion as a whole, that the Court
did not intend to limit the representative's role so severely;' 4 '
the employer's ability to limit the role of the representative
was restricted to reasonably preventing a collective-bargaining
or adversary confrontation with the representative.' 42
The Board's Southwestern Bell decision was recently
cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Texaco,
Inc.'s In that case, the court upheld the Board's determina-
tion that the employer violated the employee's right to repre-
sentation by refusing to permit the representative to speak
and, thereby, "relegating him to the role of a passive ob-
server.' 44 In reaching its decision, the court employed the
same analysis that the Board had used in Southwestern Bell.
The Board's Southwestern Bell decision and the Ninth
Circuit's Texaco opinion are reasonable interpretations of
Weingarten. The right to representation should include the
right to benefit from that representative. The employee is en-
titled to the aid, assistance, and protection of his representa-
tive.' 45 Weingarten creates more than a right to silent repre-
sentation, it creates a statutory right of assistance.'" The
employer is still free to exercise his option to refuse represen-
tation and conduct the inquiry without interviewing the em-
138. 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980)(petition for review pending, 5th Cir., No. 80-
2072). Accord, United States Postal Serv., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (Denver Bulk Mail
Center) (1981).
139. Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins, Penello and Truesdale.
140. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613.
141. Id. at 613.
142. Id.
143. 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 126-27.
145. 420 U.S. at 262-63.
146. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613.
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ployee. 147 The Southwestern Bell decision encourages effec-
tive representation. To have found otherwise would have
severely decimated the right to representation and would
have, in effect, rescinded the section 7 right "to engage in...
concerted activities for .. .mutual aid or protection."148
F. The Remedy
1. Evolution of the make-whole remedy
In early Weingarten cases the common remedy was an or-
der requiring the employer to cease and desist from requiring
employees to take part in interviews without representation
and to post a notice to its employees that it would refrain
from such activity in the future. 49 In Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.' 50 the Board, without comment, ordered a make-
whole remedy which required reinstatement with backpay for
four employees who were either discharged or suspended for
falsely claiming that a fellow employee's injury was work-re-
lated. The Board consistently afforded a make-whole remedy
after that decision, even in cases where the adverse personnel
action was based on the employee's misconduct.1 51 It did not
limit that remedy to situations, as in Quality Manufacturing,
where employees were disciplined specifically for invoking
their Weingarten rights.
The rationale for applying a make-whole remedy in all
cases has never been clearly stated. Apparently, the Board
had two reasons for imposing that remedy. First, if the em-
147. Mehary Medical College, 236 N.L.R.B. 1396.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
149. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (employees suspended and
later discharged for theft of company property); Detroit Edison Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 622
(1975)(employee suspended for filing altered meal receipt in support of reimburse-
ment claim); Keystone Steel and Wire, 217 N.L.R.B. 995 (1975) (written notice given
for unsatisfactory work).
150. 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977). See generally authorities cited at note 10 supra.
151. See, e.g., Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforce-
ment denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978) (backpay and removal of layoff notice from
personnel files for employee who had been laid off for two weeks because of low pro-
duction); Glomac Plastics, 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1323 (1978), enforced in pertinent
part, 592 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979) (backpay and personnel records expunged for em-
ployee who was disciplined for errors in her production cards); Niagra Falls Memorial
Medical Center, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 342, 352 (1978) (backpay and removal from per-
sonnel files of reprimand to an employee who had misinformed her employer of her
whereabouts). The typical make-whole remedy provides for reinstatement, backpay,
and expungement of personnel records.
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ployer had permitted the representative to participate, the
representative might have been able to raise extenuating or
mitigating circumstances and the employer might not have
imposed discipline, or the action he took might have been less
severe."5 2 Second, it is "virtually impossible" in mixed-motive
cases '5 to determine whether the employer disciplined the
employee for exercising his Weingarten rights or for the ac-
tion which was the basis for the disciplinary interview. 15 4
2. Criticisms of the make-whole remedy.
The practical criticism of the application of a make-whole
remedy in all Weingarten cases is that employees who are dis-
ciplined for lawful reasons are reinstated because the em-
ployer violated their right to representation. Reinstating indi-
viduals who were disciplined for legitimate reasons and
awarding them backpay will not promote industrial harmony.
The legal issue concerning the application of the make-
whole remedy is whether the Board can order reinstatement
of an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated, where
there is evidence that he was disciplined for cause, "despite
the fact that section 10(c) of the Act prohibits the reinstate-
ment of an employee who was fired for cause."' 55 In NLRB v.
Potter Electric Signal Co.5' the Eighth Circuit answered that
question in the negative. That court held that section 10(c)",
prohibited the Board from granting a make-whole remedy
where the employees were not discharged for requesting union
assistance but were instead discharged for a fight that re-
sulted in shutting down the production line. The court relied
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Fibreboard Paper Prod-
152. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 6 slip op. at 7-9 (1980) (dissenting
opinion of Member Jenkins); United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979).
153. The term "mixed motive" refers to cases where the employer has more
than one reason for disciplining an employee. Discipline could be imposed for cause
which would be lawful, or to discourage employees' concerted activity which would be
in violation of the NLRA.
154. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 600 (1980) (dissenting opinion of
Member Jenkins).
155. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1169 n.31 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979).
157. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any indi-
vidual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the
payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
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ucts Corp. v. NLRBI'5 which found that section 10(c) pre-
cludes the Board from reinstating an employee who was dis-
charged for misconduct.
3. The Board's current remedy
In Kraft Foods, Inc.15 ' the Board modified its position
and set forth the circumstances in which a make-whole rem-
edy would be ordered. That remedy is warranted if a prima
facie showing is made that an investigatory interview was con-
ducted in violation of Weingarten and that the employee
whose rights were violated was later disciplined for conduct
which was the subject of the interview. The burden then shifts
to the employer to negate the prima facie showing by demon-
strating that the decision to discipline the employee was not
based on information obtained at the unlawful interview. If
the employer meets its burden the Board will not order a
make-whole remedy but will issue a cease and desist order. 160
Entry of a make-whole order does not forever foreclose
the employer from discharging the employee because of the
conduct which was the subject of the interview. The Board
merely requires that the employer not discharge the employee
on the basis of any information obtained at the interview. 161
The effect of the Board's new position is unclear. It may
be, as Board Member Jenkins claimed in his dissent in Kraft
Foods, that the new scheme will be ineffective in differentiat-
ing between situations where the employer imposes discipline
based on information obtained at an unlawful interview and
where he acts on the basis of information obtained indepen-
dently. 6 ' The Board is, however, attempting to adopt a more
tenable position and provide a make-whole remedy only where
employees are not dismissed for cause. Such a stringent rem-
edy is helpful in encouraging the employer to observe an em-
ployee's right to effective representation.
158. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
159. 251 N.L.R.B.
160. Id.
161. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980).
162. 251 N.L.R.B. 933 Compare Coyne Cylinder Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 198
(1980) (discipline based on independent information) with Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 251 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1980), and Kahn's & Co., Div. of Consolidated Food Co.,
253 N.L.R.B. 25 (1980) and Roadway Express, Inc., (John E. Kloiber), 251 N.L.R.B.
No. 138 (1980) (discipline was based on information obtained at the disciplinary
interview).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc. is unclear as to the precise nature of the
representative's and the union's roles, subsequent decisions by
the NLRB have established a patchwork of legal rights and
responsibilities which to some extent defines those roles. If,
however, those decisions are viewed as establishing a right to
effective representation at disciplinary interviews, a cohesive
pattern emerges which can be tailored to provide employees
with adequate protection of their rights.
Under a system of effective representation the union rep-
resentative can request a preinterview consultation with the
employee in order to fully inform him of his right to represen-
tation, the employer's options if he invokes that right, and of
his ability to waive representation. The preinterview consulta-
tion must be held other than on company time and the em-
ployer must postpone the interview in order to allow for such
consultation. At the interview the representative must be al-
lowed to participate in order to provide the employee with the
aid and protection he is entitled to under section 7 of the
NLRA. If an employer does not respect an employee's right to
representation, the Board can issue a cease and desist order.
If the employer, however, takes disciplinary action on the ba-
sis of information obtained at an unlawful interview, the
Board may order a make-whole remedy.
Such a system of effective representation is a reasonable
construction of both section 7 of the NLRA and the Supreme
Court's opinion in Weingarten. Thus, effective representation
affords employees adequate protection of their rights at disci-
plinary interviews and also takes cognizance of the employer's
legitimate prerogatives as set forth in Weingarten. Recent
Board decisions that are important to effective representation
have not yet come before the courts of appeals for enforce-
ment. The courts should recognize the interrelatedness of the
elements of effective representation and defer to the Board's
reasonable interpretation of section 7.
Steven J. Barth
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